THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Richard B. Lillich*
The original "game plan" of the Founding Fathers of the United Nations
international human rights program was, first, to spell out in a non-binding
Universal Declaration of Human Rights' the general principles falling within
the phrase "human rights and fundamental freedoms" found in the UN
Charter,2 and then to draft a covenant (which later became two covenants)
and various specific conventions relating to particular human rights that
would contain legally binding obligations together with implementation
provisions for those states that ratified such treaties.' Thus, they intended
international human rights law to be primarily, perhaps even exclusively,
conventional law. That substantial portions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted in 1948, eventually might become customary
international law, and therefore binding on all states, was beyond the
comprehension and vision of all but a few of the participants.4
Over the years, however, the Universal Declaration took on a life of its
own,' aided in no small measure by the fact that the two International
Covenants on Civil and Political Rights6 and Economic, Social and Cultural
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research grant that enabled him to complete this Introduction and help edit this Symposium.
'G. A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/180, at 71 (1948).
2 U.N. Charter arts. 1, 13 & 55,
c.
3 For a most useful summary of how this plan was carried out, by one who was "present
at the creation," see Louis B. Sohn, A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human
Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 39, 59-174 (Eighteenth Report of the
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace ed., 1968).
4 But see JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT
ADVENTURE

64-65 (1984).

s For early documentation of this process, see Egon Schwelb, The Influence of the
Universal Declarationof Human Rights on Internationaland National Law, 53 PROc. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 217 (1959). See also EGON SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNT 34-74 (1964).
6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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Rights7 took until 1966 to draft and entered into force only in 1976. "The
process of creating an international law of human rights by the traditional
method of concluding international treaties" having been so prolonged, the
legal equivalent of the law of physics-that nature abhors a vacuum-came
into play and, as the late Professor Schwelb noted in 1964, "the Declaration
took over the function originally contemplated for the International Bill of
Rights as a whole. ''8 Thus as early as 1965 the late Judge Waldock, perhaps
a bit prematurely, concluded that the Universal Declaration had become, in
toto, a part of binding, customary international law.9 Three years later the
non-governmental Assembly for Human Rights adopted the Montreal
Statement, which included the assertion that the "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights... has over the years become a part of customary international law."' Also in 1968, designated by the United Nations as Human
Rights Year, the UN-sponsored International Conference on Human Rights
adopted the Proclamation of Teheran stating that "[t]he Universal Declaration
of Human Rights ... constitutes an obligation for members of the international community."'"
Of course, these statements that the Universal Declaration had become
legally binding did not make it so; they did, however, constitute important
indications that an international consensus to the effect that it reflected
customary international law was evolving.
Thus in 1976 Professor
Humphrey, who as the first Director of the UN Secretariat's Division of
Human Rights played a major role in drafting the Declaration,12 observed
that in the course of over a quarter of a century "the Declaration has been
invoked so many times both within and without the United Nations that
lawyers now are saying that, whatever the intention of its authors may have
been, the Declaration is now part of the customary law of nations and
therefore is binding on all states."'" The following year Professor Sohn

7

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
a SCHWELB, supra note 5, at 37.
9 Humphrey Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the
Significance of the EuropeanConvention, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RiGHTS
15 (Int'l & Comp. L.Q. Supp. No. 11, 1965).
10 Montreal Statement, 9 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 94, 95 (June 1968).
" Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968).
12 See HUMPHREY, supra note 4, at 31-33 & 42-43.
13John P. Humphrey, The InternationalBill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17
WM. & MARY L. REv. 527 (1976). See also HUMPHREY, supra note 4, at 75-76.
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opined that he believed the Universal Declaration to be not only "an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter obligations but also a binding
instrument in its own right.... ,.4 In 1980 Professor McDougal and his

colleagues, after describing "the evolution of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights from its first status as mere common aspiration to its present
wide acceptance as authoritative legal requirement,"' 5 also reached the
conclusion that it had become "established customary international law,
having the 16attributes of jus cogens and constituting the heart of a global bill
'
of rights.
Evidence of state practice confirming that at least some norms found in
the Universal Declaration were thought to have become customary international law was provided in dramatic fashion by the United States in two
exceptionally significant cases---one international, one domestic---decided in
1980. In its Memorial to the International Court of Justice in the Hostages
case,' 7 the United States argued that Iran had violated "certain fundamental
human rights" of the hostages "now reflected, inter alia, in the Charter of the
United Nations, the Universal Declarationof Human Rights and corresponding portions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
.... The Court subsequently endorsed this argument in its Judgment:
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and
to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of
hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the

14Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129, 133
(1977). See also Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1982).
'5 MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD LAsswELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 272 (1980). The description of this evolution is found in id. at 320-

32.
16 Id. at 274. See also Lung-chu Chen, Restatement: Protection of Persons, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 542, 546-47 (1989).
" Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24, 1980).
t' Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings (Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran) 182 (Jan. 12, 1980) (emphasis added).
As evidence of such rights, the Memorial cited Articles 3, 5, 7, 9, 12 and 13 of the Universal
Declaration, id. at 182 n.36, which cover, respectively, the right to life, liberty and security
of person; the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
the right to equality before the law and to non-discrimination in its application; the prohibition
of arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to privacy; and the right to freedom of movement.
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principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as
with the fundamentalprinciples enumeratedin the Universal
Declarationof Human Rights. 9

While the above passage can be read narrowly to single out the prohibition
against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and
the right to liberty and security of person for special status, Professor
Rodley's more convincing interpretation, with which the present writer
agrees, "is that the Court was simply stating that the [Universal] Declaration
as a whole propounds fundamental principles recognized by general
international law."' 2
2 ' the United States,
Also in 1980, in the case of Filartigav. Pena-Irala,
pursuant to a request by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at
the end of oral argument, submitted an important amicus curiae brief further22
explaining its views on the customary international law of human rights.
Filartigainvolved an action by two Paraguayan plaintiffs against another
Paraguayan citizen for the torture and death of their son and brother. The
case was brought under the Alien Tort Statute, which provides that "[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."' Since the United States had yet to ratify the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 Article 7 of which prohibits
torture, the plaintiffs could not rely upon it to establish jurisdiction under the
Statute, but instead had to show that torture violated "the law of nations,"
i.e., customary international law.
In its brief the United States contended that customary international law
now guarantees individuals "certain fundamental human rights,"' including

1980 I.CJ. at 42 (emphasis added).
20

Nigel S. Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the

World Court, 38 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 321, 326 (1989).
2'630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
' Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, reprinted
in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Memorandum].
" 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
24 Supra note 6. The United States eventually ratified the Covenant on September 8,
1992. See generally RICHARD B. LILJICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RiGHTs: PROBLEMS OF LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 248-68 (3d ed., 1995).
25 U.S. Memorandum, supra note 22, at 589.
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the right to be free from torture.2
"This universal condemnation [of
torture]," the brief concluded after an extensive canvass of the evidence
demonstrating the existence of such an international norm, "is made explicit
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that 'No one
,2" The Court of Appeals, which
shall be subjected to torture . ...
undertook its own thorough examination of the sources from which
customary international law is derived,' endorsed the government's views
when it unanimously held that the prohibition against torture "has become
part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. .. ."9 Thus state practice,
confirmed by a judicial decision, again affmned that certain fundamental
human rights contained in the Universal Declaration now have acquired the
status of customary international law.
The Filartiga case was almost unanimously lauded by the many legal
commentators appraising it.30 It has spawned a flurry of Alien Tort Statute
litigation that, coupled with the occasional instance where customary
international human rights law has been invoked in other contexts, 32 has

2
2

Id. at 595-601.
Id. at 598 (emphasis added), citing Article 5 of the Universal Declaration, supra note

1.
n8See 630 F.2d at 880-85.
2

Id. at 882 (emphasis added).

-' See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over
InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Human Rights Symposium, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981);
Symposium: FederalJurisdiction,Human Rights and the Law of Nations: Essays on Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 11 GA. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 305 (1981); and the articles cited in Bert B.
Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charterand United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-

1955, 69 IowA L. REv. 901 n.l. (1984). But see Michael Danaher, Case Comment, Torture
as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 33 STAN. L. REv. 353

(1981).
31 For a relatively recent compilation of cases that have arisen under the Statute, all but
a handful since Filartiga, see Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction andApplication
of Alien Tort Statute (28 USCS § 1350), Providingfor Federal Jurisdiction over Alien's
Action for Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116

A.L.R. FED. 387 (1993).
32 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980) ("[Ajrbitrary
detention is prohibited by customary international law."), afd on constitutionalgrounds sub
nom. Rodriguiz-Femandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), where an
excludable Cuban refugee sought and obtained a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his
confinement in a federal penitentiary pending deportation violated his constitutional rights.
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produced a sizeable body of U.S. case law affir-ming that a number of the
norms found in the Universal Declaration have achieved customary
international law status. In addition to the prohibition against torture, they
include the prohibitions against arbitrary detention, 3 summary execution or
murder,' "causing the disappearance" of individuals, 35 cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment,' 6 and genocide.37
All these core human rights-along with prohibitions against slavery or
the slave trade, systematic racial discrimination, and a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights-are listed in the
blackletter of Section 702 of the American Law Institute's Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 8 which purports
to state the generally accepted "Customary International Law of Human
Rights" as of 1987. As was to have been expected, 39 however, human
rights not specifically enumerated in Section 702's blackletter have not been
held by U.S. courts to have achieved customary international law status, even
when found in the Universal Declaration. They include the right to
education,' the right to property,4 ' and the right of free speech.42 Arguments that these and other human rights, whether contained in the Declaration or not, now are part of customary international law can be expected to

3See text accompanying supra note 32.

4Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
6Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185-89 (D. Mass. 1995).
Id. at 187 n.35 (dictum). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
held that not only genocide, but also war crimes and crimes against humanity, constituted
violations of customary international law. See Kadic v. Karadzic, Nos. 94-9035 & 94-9069,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28826, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 1995).
"

3 RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §
702 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. For critiques of Section 702 in draft form and after
its adoption, see Richard B. Lillich, The Revised Draft Restatement of the Foreign Relations
Law of the UnitedStates and Customary InternationalLaw: Remarks, 79 PROc. AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. 84 (1985) and Chen, supra note 16, at 550-53.
"' See Liflich, supra note 38, at 85-86. See generally Karl M. Meesen, [Foreword to]
Special Review Essays: The Restatement (Third) of the ForeignRelations Law of the United
States, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 433, 434 (1989) ("ITihe Restatement will be of greatest
significance in the United States itself. In fact, it will be hard to persuade U.S. Federal and

State courts of international law rules differing from those set out in the Restatement.").
' In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd
unreportedmemo., (5th Cir. 1981), affid sub nom. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
41 De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th
Cir. 1985).
42Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
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be made in courts in the United States with increasing frequency.43
As one who has prepared affidavits, been an expert witness and helped to
draft numerous amicus curiae briefs in many of the U.S. cases that have
developed the customary international law of human rights over the past 15
years, the present writer came to believe by the early 1990s that some stocktaking was highly desirable-indeed sorely needed-in this area. The
normative character of the Universal Declaration, as well as the jurisprudential underpinnings of customary international human rights law in general
and, more specifically, its past as well as potential future application in
courts in the United States, seemed eminently worthy of review and
reassessment by legal scholars and human rights practitioners. While the
present writer, at Professor Meron's urging, had completed in 1981 a very
tentative survey of the civil rights articles in the Universal Declaration to see
which could be said to reflect customary international law," no systematic
attempt to collect and evaluate the practice of states with respect to the
Declaration had been made.45 Indeed, it was not until 1990 that the
International Law Association's Committee on the Enforcement of Human

"'At the Symposium Professor Henkin, the Restatement's Chief Reporter, indicated that
if he were drafting Section 702 today he would include as customary international law rights
the right to property and freedom from gender discrimination (see RESTATEMENT, supra note
38, § 702 cmts. k, 1), plus the right to personal autonomy and the right to live in a democratic
society. For the Human Rights Committee's list of rights found in the UN Civil and Political
Covenant that it believes already represent customary international law, see text infra note
100.
4 Richard B. Lillich, Civil Rights, in 1 THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POucY ISSUES 115 (1984).
's

See HUMPHREY, supra note 4, at 75:

I would need a very long chapter to review all the evidence that could
be marshalled in support of the proposition that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights is now part of the customary law of nations. As far as
I know, no one has ever attempted to bring together and analyze the
countless times that the Declaration has been invoked, either within or
outside the United Nations, or been used as the standard of permissible
action.
See also THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY

LAW 94 (1989): "Empiric studies of state practice are therefore of the highest importance in
establishing whether a particular right has matured into customary law." The author cites as
a (rare) example "the detailed study of national practices" contained in HURST HANNUM, THE
RIGHT To LEAvE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAw AND PRACTICE (1987).
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Rights Law began a more thorough study, one which led to reports in
199246 and 199447 and served as the basis for the ILA's Buenos Aires
Declaration on the Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law.41 The latter confirmed the Committee's
view that "there would seem to be little argument that many provisions of
'
the [Universal] Declaration today do reflect customary international law."49
The state practice gathered by the ILA and set out in Professor Hannum's
article in this Symposium is impressive indeed. It demonstrates beyond any
doubt, in this writer's opinion,' that many of the norms found in the
Universal Declaration and replicated in the Civil and Political Covenant now
constitute part of customary international law binding upon all states. The
rich diversity of state practice found in the article also reflects the fact that
in the human rights arena "it is clear that [in] determining whether or not a
particular customary law norm exists [one must] draw upon a wide variety
of sources."'" This approach to ascertaining custom mirrors that of the
Restatement's reporters, who observed that "the practice of states that is
accepted as building customary international law of human rights includes
some forms of conduct different from those that build customary internation-

6 Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law, Interim Report on the Status of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, in REPORT
OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH CONFERENCE 446 (Cairo 1992).
' Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law, FinalReport on the Status of
the Universal Declarationof Human Rights in National and InternationalLaw, in REPORT
OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONFERENE 525 (Buenos Aires 1994).
48Id. at 29.
' Id. at 544. The uncut version of the Committee's Final Report appears in this
Symposium as Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights in
National and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995-96).
-oSee also the views of the Human Rights Committee in the text infra note 100.
51Id. at [34]. The author quotes Professor Brownlie who, after observing generally that
the "sources of custom are very numerous," includes among them:
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions
of official legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, ...
executive decisions and practices. .. comments by governments on
drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other

LAN

international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the
practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions
in the United Nations General Assembly.
BROWNLiE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (4th ed., 1990).
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al law generally."52 Greater emphasis especially is placed on widely
accepted multilateral treaties and UN General Assembly resolutions like the
Universal Declaration. Inspired in large measure by Filartiga and its
progeny, several prominent legal scholars, notably Professor Schachter"
and Professor Meron,M have endorsed and developed the Restatement's

2

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 38, § 701 note 2. The reporters noted that practice accepted

as building customary international human rights law included:
virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its human
rights provisions, and virtually universal and frequently reiterated
acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even if only in
principle; virtually universal participation of states in the preparation and
adoption of international agreements recognizing human rights principles
generally, or particular rights; the adoption of human rights principles by
states in regional organizations in Europe, Latin American, and Africa
.. ; general support by states for United Nations resolutions declaring,
recognizing, invoking, and applying international human rights principles
as international law; action by states to conform their national law or
practice to standards or principles declared by international bodies, and
the incorporation of human rights provisions, directly or by reference, in
national constitutions and law; invocation of human rights principles in
national policy, in diplomatic practice, in international organization
activities and actions; and other diplomatic communications or action by
states reflecting the view that certain practices violate international human
rights law, including condemnation and other adverse state reactions to
violations by other states.
Id. 53
1 See Schachter, InternationalLaw in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS
9, 334-35 (1982-V):
Whether human rights obligations have become customary law cannot
readily be answered on the basis of the usual process of customary law
formation. States do not usually make claims on other States or protest
violations that do not affect their nationals. In that sense, one can find
scant State practice accompanied by opinio juris. Arbitral awards and
international judicial decisions are also rare except in tribunals based on
treaties such as the European and Inter-American courts of human rights.

The arguments advanced in support of a finding that rights are a part of
customary law rely on different kinds of evidence... [none of which]
confirm to the traditional criteria.
4 MERON, supra note 45, at 92-94:
The Restatement... attempts.. . to identify customary human rights.
Of greater interest than the identification of already accepted customary
human rights are the types of evidence used to identify them and the
processes used to support the maturation of a right into customary status.
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approach to the determination of customary international human rights law.
If these developments in the area of customary international human rights
law were not enough to warrant the stock-taking suggested two paragraphs
above, the appearance in 1992 of a somewhat strident critique by two
distinguished foreign scholars of what they regard as a U.S. "customary-lawof-human rights school"55 served to spur the present writer and his sometime colleague, Professor Wilner, into organizing the 1994 Colloquium at the
University of Georgia that brought together the twelve contributors to this
Symposium for two days of discussion and debate.' Since the Colloquium
did not focus except in passing on the Simma-Alston critique of U.S.
scholarship and lawyering in the international human rights law area,
however, a brief description and response to it here may serve both to
introduce the topic of this Symposium and to call attention to its general
theme and various specific points made in the articles that follow.

... The Restatement's list [see text accompanying supra note 52] of
types of evidence to be utilized to prove customary human rights is
extremely useful. Also useful are the indicators suggested by Professor
Schachter, who refers to the need to assess general statements on human
rights by international bodies by reference to actual state practice and the
intensity and depth of third-party condemnation of violations....
Of course, the initial inquiry must aim at the determination whether, at
a minimum, the definition of the core norm claiming customary law status
and preferably the contours of the norm have been widely accepted. In
this context my own preferred indicators evincing customary human rights
are, first, the degree to which a statement of a particular right in one
human rights instrument, especially a human rights treaty, has been
repeated in other human rights instruments, and second, the confirmation
of the right in national practice, primarily through the incorporation of the
right in national laws. ... It is, of course, to be expected that those
rights which are most crucial to the protection of human dignity and of
universally accepted values of humanity, and whose violation triggers
broad condemnation by the international community, will require a lesser
amount of confirmatory evidence.
s Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and GeneralPrinciples, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 106 (1992).
The present writer served as Visiting Woodruff Professor of International Law at the
University of Georgia School of Law during the 1994 Spring Semester. He would like to
express his appreciation to Dean Edward D. Spurgeon of the School of Law for his
encouragement and financial support that made the holding of the Colloquium and the
publication of this Symposium possible.
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Preliminarily, it should be noted that the Simma-Alston critique comes as

something of a surprise to anyone familiar with their past writings.
Although Professor Simma revealed some time ago that he was no fan of
customary international human rights law, he nevertheless acknowledged that
it "has flowered quite impressively in many domestic legal orders."57
Indeed, while critical of the International Court of Justice's approach to the
determination of customary international law in the Nicaragua case, 58 he

rightly recognized that most of the candidates for customary international
human rights law status found in Section 702 of the Restatement would so
qualify according to that Judgment, which he labeled "the Court's own
contribution to the softening of custom."59 Moreover, over a decade ago,

as two contributors to this Symposium,' perhaps puckishly, have pointed
out, Professor Alston had no difficulty in finding "a large and growing body
of evidence" to support the proposition that the first 21 articles of the
Universal Declaration-concerned exclusively with civil and political
rights-already had become part of customary international law.6 Whatever the reasons for the first author's reassessment of his prior views and the
second author's inexplicable volte-face, the Simma-Alston critique was
- 1 Bruno

Simma, A Hard Look at Soft Law: Remarks, 82 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 377,
378 (1988).
s8 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27). Professor Simma noted that in
Nicaragua, "after paying lip service to the classic view [of custom], the Court itself has
submitted to the current trend of deemphasizing practice in favor of opinio juris and looking
to soft law innovations for determining the content of this objective element .... " Simma,
supra note 57, at 379.
" Id.
60 See Hannum, supra note 49, at 324; Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and
Evidence of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147, 149 (1995-96).
61 Philip Alston, The Universal Declaration at 35: Western and Pass,$or Alive and
Universal, 31 I.C.J. Rev. 60, 69 (Dec. 1983). It is passing strange, to say the least, that the
author of the above-cited article now joins Professor Simma in making the characteristically
(for the former) uncharitable charge of "normative chauvinism, albeit of an unintentional or
sub-conscious variety," against Professor Schachter, Professor Meron, the present writer and
even the Restatement, whose far more modest list of civil and political rights found in Section
702 they savage as "a particularly striking instance of assuming that American values are
synonymous with those reflected in international law." Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at
94. Even more puzzling is the fact that six pages later they concede that a strong case can
be made that many of the rights contained in Section 702 "are capable of satisfying the
appropriate criteria for the creation of customary international law." Id. at 100. See also text
supra notes 58-59.
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completely unexpected.62
However one may feel about caustic comments from a critic whose
previously recorded views were far more extreme than the "radical approach
to custom" the selfsame critic now so energetically deplores, 63 one still may
decide to take note of his pronouncements, like Saul's after his revelation on
the road to Damascus, even if one is reluctant to accept their validity on
faith. Especially is this so when "the word" emanates from two distinguished international lawyers, well-known for their scholarly writings and
UN activities in the human rights field." What then, briefly, is their
message?
In a nutshell, stripped of its "trashing customary international human rights
law" 5 rhetoric, the Simma-Alston critique rests upon a preference for and
commitment to a pre-Nicaragua,6 perhaps even pre-North Sea Continental
Shelf case67 approach to customary international law formation, an approach
that looks "into the past to identify customary patterns of State practice" and
then turns "this empirical result into a normative projection for the

6'Most certainly by the present writer and Professor Schachter, who in August 1990 had
been invited to the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, to comment upon

the first draft of the authors' article!
' Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 96. Other adjectives employed throughout the
Simma-Alston critique are "dubious," "progressive," and "streamlined." All are employed
in one splendid polemical sentence in the authors' conclusion: "The mainstream position,
particularly in the United States, satisfies its appetite by resorting to a progressive, streamlined
theory of customary law, more or less stripped of the traditional practice requirement, and
through this dubious operation is able to find a customary law of human rights whenever it
is needed." Id. at 107. For one scholar-litigant's plea of innocence to such charges, see

Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary InternationalNorms to the Death Penalty in the
United States, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165 (1995-96).
"Professors Alston and Simma are members of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, created by the Economic and Social Council in 1986 to monitor state parties'
compliance with their reporting obligations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 7, and have served as Chairman and Rapporteur
thereof.
"With apologies to one of the contributors to this Symposium. See D'Amato, Trashing
Customary InternationalLaw, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101 (1987).
66 See supra note 58.
67 North Sea Continental Shelf Case (F.R.G. v. Den.) (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3
(Judgment of February 20).
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future."" This approach, emphasizing "hard core" past practice to the near69
exclusion of customary international law's other component, opinio juris,
is expressly criticized by several of the contributors to this Symposium,7
and would appear to be well outside the "mainstream" of contemporary
international law scholarship.7" Certainly the consensus that emerges from
this Symposium, while not rejecting "the established formal criteria of

" Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 89. They quote with approval the late Professor
Kelsen's observation that "states ought to behave as they have customarily behaved." Hans
Kelsen, Principles of International Law 418 (1952).
1 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 102(2): "Customary international law results from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation,"
see also id., cmt. c.
"0See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 63, at 169; Paust, supra note 60, at 148-50. All but
one of the other contributors either expressly or impliedly reject the Simma-Alston critique.
But cf Professor Weisburd, who, after an extensive examination of the travaux pr~paratories
of the Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 6, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981), and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984) (entered intoforce June 26,
1987), argues that the states drafting those treaties did not regard the rights included therein
to be part of customary international law in 1966, 1979 and 1984 respectively. Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal InternationalActs on the Customary Law
of Human Rights, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 116-20 (1995-96). Nor, after assessing
patterns of adherence to or practice under the treaties, does he believe they have achieved that
status even today. Id.
For an earlier debate by this author and Professor D'Amato on the role of treaties in the
creation of customary international human rights law, compare Arthur M. Weisburd,
Customary InternationalLaw: The Problem of Treaties. 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1
(1988) (relatively unimportant) with Anthony D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to
Professor Weisburd, 21 id. at 459 (1988) (exceptionally important). Professor D'Amato
restates his belief that treaties are the most obvious evidence of state practice in the customary
international human rights law area in his contribution to this Symposium. See Anthony
D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of
Paradigms,25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 97-98 (1995-96).
71 As even Professors Simma and Alston acknowledge in the quotation accompanying
supra note 63. Elsewhere they would appear to associate themselves with "an embattled
group of writers who declare themselves unable to verify the presence of (what they perceive
to be) the prerequisites of customary international law in a large part of a field so torn by
ideology and politics, and so replete with hypocrisy, double standards and second thoughts."
Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 85.
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custom,"" supports the Restatement" in looking as well to other sources
of state practice and in finding opiniojuris in state conduct not necessarily
involving interaction with other states.74 This consensus, as even Professors
Simma and Alston admit, fully accords with the teachings of the Nicaragua
case" and the views of the vast majority of legal commentators.76
In an attempt to close their critique on a positive note, and without doubt
as homage to Professor Simma's former mentor, the late Professor Verdross,
the learned authors devote several pages towards the end of their lengthy
article to developing an alternative basis for a non-conventional legal
obligation in the human rights area that would bind all states, namely,

' Id. at 99. The attitude of Professors Simma and Alston towards these "formal criteria"
seems somewhat crabbed and rigid; moreover, they set the bar of state practice so high that
few international human rights norms could ever clear it, as they themselves acknowledge.
Id. at 101. In this regard, Professor Chamey recently made the point, one well-known to any
international law practitioner but apparently not to all academics, that "[tlhe evidence
traditionally used to establish new [and, indeed, often old] norms of international law is
considerably less comprehensive and persuasive than some theory would suggest.. "
Jonathan I. Chamey, Universal InternationalLaw, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 537-38 (1993).
Furthermore, in words that could have been written to respond to the Simma-Alston critique,
he observed that:
[t]he relatively exclusive ways of the past are not suitable for contemporary circumstances. While customary law is still created in the traditional
way, that process has increasingly given way in recent years to a more
structural method, especially in the case of important normative developments.
Rather than state practice and opinio juris, multilateral forums often
play a central role in the creation and shaping of contemporary international law.
Id. at 543.
7 See text accompanying supra note 52.
4 See generally D'Amato, supra note 70; Paust, supra note 60; Fitzpatrick, supra note
63; Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Proving International Human Rights Law in
Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (1995-96). Hannum,
supra note 49.
" They note that the Court only paid "lip-service to the classic view [of state practice]"
to which they remain committed. Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 96. See also text at
and accompanying supra notes 58-59.
' Id.at 84: "[A] majority of authors today take the view that international human rights
obligations incumbent upon States may, and actually do, also derive from customary
international law."
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general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," which they
contend should not be limited to legal principles developed in foro
domestico, but also be extended to such principles accepted in an international setting, e.g., by their express articulation in U.N. General Assembly
declarations." They admit that "the concept of custom will be difficult to
distinguish from that of general principles recognized internationally in the
first instance, 79 and they also acknowledge that "general principles have
not fared too well as a source of international law, mainly due to their
natural law flavour and the uncertainties surrounding the ways in which they
are to be established and applied."'se Nevertheless, they apparently believe
that reliance upon general principles sidesteps the problems associated with
proving customary international law. This belief is puzzling, to say the least,
unless, like the authors of the latest edition of Oppenheim, they also believe
that general principles are an independent source of international law giving
rise to legal rules binding upon states even without their consent. 81 Yet
they plainly state that:
the recourse to general principles suggested here remains
grounded in a consensualistconception of internationallaw.
Consequently, what is required for the establishment of
human rights obligations qua general principles is essentially
the same kind of convincing evidence of general acceptance
and recognition that Schachter asks for-and finds-in order

"Statute

of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1055,

1060 (1945).
71

Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 102.

9 Id.
8oId. at

107. The quotation is something of an understatement. For a succinct summary
of the "considerable debate over the nature of international obligations derived from general
principles of law," see Charney, supra note 72, at 535. See also 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-40 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
SI

d. at 38-40 passim. Cf. Charney, supra note 72, at 535-36:
Another view holds that the usage of a principle found in all the
principal legal systems is analogous to state practice as required for
customary international law. If the practice is sufficiently uniform, a
norm of international law is established. Uniform domestic practice
converts the domestic rule into one of international law. Proof that states
accept the rule as international law is not required.

See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 102(4) cmt. I & note 7; § 701(c) cmt. b & notes 2
& 3; § 702 note 1.
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to arrive at customary international law. However, this
material is not equated with State practice but is rather seen
as a variety of ways in which moral and humanitarian
considerations find a more direct and spontaneous "expression in legal form."8 2
Leaving aside criticism of the highly abstract, even abstruse, language in
their last sentence, one ultimately is left wondering what benefits the authors
perceive will come from having recourse to general principles if their
establishment depends upon proving their consensual acceptance by
states-manifested by "the same kind of convincing evidence" the authors
find objectionable when used by other international lawyers to establish
customary international law norms.8 3
It is true, of course, that general principles may play a role in the human
rights area; this role, however, traditionally has been regarded as one of
"promoting the passage of human rights into customary law,"'" not of
metamorphasizing them into free-standing, independent rules of international
law."
Professors Simma and Alston invoke the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice in support of their thesis, contending that none
of its judgments addressing human rights issues "expressly speak of
customary international law... ."86 This debater's point is unpersuasive;
while the Court, as they state, "has unambiguously accepted that the
obligation to respect fundamental human rights is an obligation under
87
general international law,""
this language normally is equated with
customary international law, not general principles of law within the meaning

8 Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 105 (emphasis added).
3 Ironically, a criticism also made by Professor Weisburd, albeit from a different
perspective. See Weisburd, supra note 70, at 105 n.9.
" MERON, supra note 45, at 88. Professor Merson predicts that general principles
increasingly will become "a route for the passage of international human rights norms into
general international law." Id. at 88-89. Whether he equates general international law with
customary international law, or thinks it embraces general principles as well, is not clear.
Indeed, the author observes that, "as in other fields of international law, the distinction
between international customary law... and general principles of law.., will eventually
become blurred." Id. at 89.
85But see text supra note 81.

6Simma & Alston, supra note 55, at 105.
s Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
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of Article 38(1)(c) of the Court's Statute.88
Furthermore, domestic courts routinely rely upon customary international
law rather than general principles in deciding cases where international
human rights norms are relevant. Ample evidence to support this proposition
is found in Professor Hannum's article, including German cases that apply
customary international law-not general principles-under Article 25 of the
Basic Law (German Constitution), which provides that "[t]he general rules
of public international law shall be an integral part of federal law." 9
Domestic courts in other Western European countries that recognize
customary international law as "part of the law of the land" presumably take

See, e.g., MERON, supra note 45, at 106-14, who devotes an entire section of one
chapter to "'he International Court of Justice and Customary Human Rights." See also id.
at 25-37, an entire section of another chapter about how the Court in the Nicaragua case,
supra note 58, attributed "customary law character to Articles 1 and 3 of the Geneva
Conventions .. " Id. at 37. Accord, RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 701(b) note 2: "The
International Court of Justice and the International Law Commission have recognized the
existence of customary human rights law." Professor Cassese believes "general international
law" and "customary international law" to be synonymous. Antonio Cassese, Modern
Constitutionsand InternationalLaw, 192 RECUEIL DES COURS 331, 391 (1985-II).

Cf.

Rodley, supra note 20.
" Grundgesetz art. 25. See Hannum, supra note 49, at 294, 347. For further discussion
of German court decisions that rely on customary international law to decide cases, see
MERON, supra note 45, at 132-34; Luzius Wildhaber & Stephan Breitenmoser, The
Relationshipbetween Customary InternationalLaw and Municipal Law in Western European

Countries, 48 ZaoRV (Heidelberg J. Int'l L.) 163, 179-82 (1988).
Professors Simma and Alston cite decisions of the German Constitutional Court and the
German Administrative Court supposedly applying "general international law" and "general
principles of international law" respectively as evidence that German case law "cannot be read
as lending support to the customary-law-of-human rights school." Simma & Alston, supra
note 55, at 106. With all due respect to a leading German jurist, the first decision is replete
with references to "general rules of public international law" (46 BVerf GE 342, 362-63
(1978)), which most authorities equate with customary international law rather than general
principles of law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Court's Statute, and the second
decision, which actually refers to "general principles of public international law" (45 ZaoRV
(Heidelberg J. Int'l L.) 88 (1985)) (emphasis added), contains no suggestion that the
Administrative Court had "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" in mind.
Thus the absence of express reference to customary international law in the above two
decisions does not mean that it was not being applied; at the very least, the decisions provide
no support for the Simma-Alston "general principles" thesis. Nota bene: Wildhaber &
Breitenmoser, supra, at 180 n.61: "Some German authors deny that the notion 'general rules
of public international law' also includes the generally recognized principles of international
law."
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the same approach. 9° Indeed, Italian courts applying customary international law under that country's constitution do not even have the option of
looking to general principles. 9' As for the United States, while the
Supreme Court has ruled that customary international law is "part of our
law,'
it never has expanded this holding to embrace general principles-nor is it likely to do so. Thus it would seem futile, even counterproductive, to undercut the growing importance of customary international
human rights law by commencing, as Professors Simma and Alston propose,
a quixotic campaign to achieve the same objectives via the general principles
approach.
As mentioned above,93 the consensus emerging from this Symposium
rejects the Simma-Alston critique; along with the Restatement, it looks not
only to traditional but also to new sources of state practice and new
expressions of opinio juris to determine and develop the content and
contours of the emerging customary international law of human rights.
Professor Henkin, whose Hague Lectures Professors Simma and Alston
invoke in support of their thesis,9 far from agreeing with them uses his
Sibley Lecture in this Symposium to highlight "the pressure, beginning at
Nuremberg in 1945, to develop and achieve recognition for a 'customary,'
'non-conventional' law of human rights (i.e., law not made by treaty)," and
correctly concludes that "there is now a significant, and increasing, amount
of such non-conventional law of human rights."9 5 While noting that "the

90 Id. at 204.

9' Id. at 184:
In contradistinction from what the Federal Constitutional Court and the
predominant doctrine in the Federal Republic of Germany assume, the
general principles of law, as stated in Art. 38(1)lit. (c) of the Statute of
the ICJ are held not to fall within the scope of Art. 10(1) of the Italian
Constitution [which refers to "generally recognized principles of
international law"].
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 670, 700 (1900).
93 See text supra notes 72-76.
9 Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES
COURS 0, 61-62 (1989-IV).
9 Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31,
37 (1995-96). Professor D'Amato, in the course of his sprightly critique of what he considers
Professor Henkin's adherence to "the Sovereignty Paradigm," views the latter as now denying
that "human rights norms have their origin in custom." D'Amato, supra note 70, at 52. He
thus proceeds to criticize Henkin both for inventing a "new source" of human rights
law--"non-conventional law"--and for deriving its content from "liberal national constitu-
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state practice supporting non-conventional human rights law looks different,
is different,"'9 his increased concern with "the national roots of internation' should be read
al human rights law"97
as a reaffirmation rather than a
rejection of the approach to the customary international law of human rights
that he pioneered when first drafting Section 702 of the Restatement a
decade ago.
That approach, which finds near-unanimous support from the contributors
to the Symposium and, save Professors Simma and Alston, from most
international lawyers in the United States and elsewhere, recently received
a resounding endorsement from the Human Rights Committee, the authoritative and prestigious body of experts from 18 countries established to monitor
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.98
In the course of its General Comment No. 24 on reservations to the
Covenant issued in 1994, the Committee reached the conclusion that states
parties to the Covenant may not make reservations to provisions therein that

tions." Id. On the latter point he concludes that "national constitutions simply are not, and
have never been, sources of international law. It is rather astounding that Professor Henkin
wants to elevate them to the status of sources of international law in order to 'explain' what
he means by 'non-conventional' law." Id. at 55.
Although the lecture origins of Professor Henkin's article and his typically flowing prose
may have introduced an element of uncertainty into his text, a careful reading thereof suggests
that he was not rejecting customary international human rights law at all, but actually equating
it with (or including it under) the phrase "non-conventional law." See text and Henkin, supra,
at 40, where he concludes that some rights in the two Covenants have become "nonconventional ('customary') law." Thus Professor D'Amato misinterprets his former mentor
on this point, which may explain his above-quoted statement that "national constitutions
simply are not, and have never been, sources of international law." That statement is accurate
to the extent that national constitutions are not independent sources of international law, but
not if it is meant to suggest that they cannot be "sources from which customary international
law is derived ...." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra note 21, at 884. Professor Henkin, like
Judge Kaufman in Filartiga,id. at 882 n.10, presumably is using them for the latter purpose.
But see Henkin, supra, at 38, where he "muddies the waters" by noting that "[s]keptics
might insist that the non-conventional law of human rights is not 'customary' in any
traditional sense;... it is not based on 'custom' or on state practice at all ....[I]n a radical
derogation from the axiom of 'sovereignty,' that law is not based on consent: at least it does
not honor or accept dissent, and it binds particular states regardless of their objection."
%Id.
97Id. at 39.

" See generally MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CCPR COMMENTARY (1993).
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Accordingly, it explained that, in

a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to
torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of
their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a
person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute
pregnant women or children, to permit the advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of
marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities
the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own
religion, or use their own language.'0
This imposing list of customary international law rights, far more expansive
than the modest number found in Section 702 of the Restatement, may incur
the ire of Professors Simma and Alston, as it already has that of the U.S.
Department of State's Legal Adviser, 1' but whatever its faults it demonstrates that the Human Rights Committee, like the International Court of

9Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 (52), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.lI/Add.6, at 3 (1994).
100 Id.
01Observations on General Comment 24 Accompanying Letter from the Hon. Conrad K.
Harper, Legal Adviser, Department to State, to the Hon. Francisco Josd Aguilar-Urbina,
Chairman, Human Rights Committee (Mar. 28, 1995) (on file with author):
The precise specification of what is contrary to customary international
law ... is a much more substantial question than indicated by the
Comment [, which] asserts in wholly conclusory fashion that a number of
propositions are customary international law which, to speak plainly, are
not. It cannot be established on the basis of practice or other authority,
for example, that the mere expression (albeit deplorable) of national,
racial or religious hatred (unaccompanied by any overt action or
preparation) is prohibited by customary international law ....
Similarly,
while many are opposed to the death penalty in general and the juvenile
death penalty in particular, the practice of States demonstrates that there
is currently no blanket prohibition in customary international law. Such
a cavalier approach to international law [raises] serious concerns about the
methodology of the Committee as well as its authority.
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Justice and the International Law Commission,' °2 now recognizes the
growing importance of customary international human rights law.
How this body of law has been developed and the challenges U.S. lawyers
face in convincing courts to recognize and apply it are the subject of five
articles in this Symposium. Paul Hoffman, former Legal Director of the
ACLU Foundation of Southern California and a prominent human rights
litigator, describes and critiques what he labels the "blank stare phenomenon," the failure of many judges to recognize the basic legitimacy of
customary international law. °3 He correctly concludes that "[tihis judicial
skepticism is one of the largest obstacles for a lawyer trying to use
He also makes the interestcustomary law in domestic litigation.""
ing-and provocative-point that one reason judges may be reluctant to find
a certain norm part of customary international law--cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment and punishment, for instance, as opposed to torture-is
the fear "that it might then be applied to U.S. government officials."' 0 5
The "critical crossroads" for Alien Tort Statute precedents, he maintains,
"will come when we try to rely upon them to sue U.S. government
defendants."' °
Beth Stephens, an attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights in New
York and counsel in a number of international human rights lawsuits,
including the Karadzic case, °7 agrees with Hoffman that "the drive to
enforce international [human rights] law has often been stymied by U.S.
courts' reluctance to apply international norms."" She shows, however,
that recent cases have moved well beyond torture "to recognize additional
customary international norms as falling within the reach of the Alien Tort

'02 See

text accompanying supra note 77.

'*3 Paul L. Hoffman, The "Blank Stare Phenomenon: Proving Customary International
Law in U.S. Courts, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181 (1995-96).

'"Id.at 182.
'0oId. at 183.
106Id. at 189. As will be the case in Alvarez-Machain v. Berellez et al., a lawsuit filed

July 9, 1993, by the former defendant in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992), against at least four U.S. DEA officials for, inter alia, prolonged arbitrary detention,
disappearance, torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment.
(Complaint on file with author.)
107See supra note 37.
log Beth Stephens, Litigating Customary InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 191 (1995-96).
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Claims Act."'"
She also makes the very important-and often overlooked-point that "pending cases also push to expand the definitions of
violations which have already been recognized,"'1 0 using as an example the
assertion in the Karadzic case that rape, forced impregnation and forced
prostitution are forms of torture under international human rights law."'
Equally important is her point that:
International human rights litigation will greatly increase
in value if it is conducted in many countries around the
world, not just in the United States. Some legal systems
resist such suits, arguing that jurisdiction requires a nexus
between the forum state and the human rights violation or
the parties. An argument can be made, however, that

international law permits-or even obligates-states to
provide a remedy to victims of gross human rights violations, even
if those violations did not occur in the forum
2
state."

The point is a good one and will be taken up again at the end of this

Introduction.
Professor Maier's interesting article "addresses the relationship between
the special attributes of customary international law and the manner in which
its norms are introduced by expert testimony into the decision making
processes of United States courts ...... 13 Although not going as far as
'09 Id.

at 194.

0

at 195.
..Id. at 196-97. Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment was defined more broadly than
heretofore in the thoughtful opinion of Judge Woodlock in Xuncax v. Gramajo, supra note
36, at 185-89, another case in which Ms. Stephens served as counsel for the plaintiffs.
" Id.

112Id. at

200.

113Maier,

supra note 74, at 206. In an earlier comment, Professor Maier advanced the

thesis that the "difficult problem of proving specific state practice can be solved in large
measure by treating these abstract customary norms of international human rights law, when
used in courts in the United States, as having their authoritative source in federal common
law. The specific content and application of these rules as federal common law rules would
then be informed by, but not dependant upon, evidence of specific state practice." Harold J.
Maier, The Role of International Law in Human Rights Litigation in the United States:
Remarks, 82 PROC. AM. SoC'y INT'L L. 456 (1988). "If the authoritative source of the
decisions is treated as federal common law," he explained, "informed by the abstract
principles of customary international human rights law, evidence of state practice applying
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Professor Sohn, who asserts that publicists really make customary international law," 4 he maintains that since the "most authoritative statements
synthesizing customary international rules [are] found in the writings of
publicists... it is not surprising that United States courts are likely to accept
the conclusions of publicists without inquiring carefully into the empirical
data from which the expert witness draws his inferences about the content
and applicability of international law."" 5 "Expert testimony about the
results of the law creation process in the international community," he also
observes, "creates confidence for courts who may be venturing into
theretofore untrodden territory. ' "16 In short, "[tihe expert witness can, if
properly used, play an educational role that is invaluable both to counsel and
117
the court."

Professor Maier sees a special role for experts in international human
rights law cases," 8 particularly in making clear that "there are universal
norms of conduct that result from human expectations and that these
expectations of pattern and uniformity are as important a source of
international law as are any formal or informal indicia of consent expressed
through the institution of the sovereign nation state."" 9 The present writer
agrees completely with the thrust of Maier's article. He only would add that
human rights litigators should pay heed to Maier's observations and make
more use of expert testimony, as they did in the early 1980s, rather than
resort exclusively to the ubiquitous (and arguably somewhat less effective)
"Affidavit of International Law Scholars" that has become the norm in recent

the principle in contexts specifically like those before the court would no longer be
necessary." Id. at 459. Human rights practitioners have been slow to pick up his intriguing
argument.
114Louis B. Sohn, Sources of InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 399 (199596): "I submit that states really never make international law on the subject of human rights.
It is made by the people who care; the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and
the authors of articles in leading international law journals."
"5 Maier, supra note 74, at 212. The step from merely referring to the writings of
publicists to permitting their oral testimony as expert witnesses was one made several decades
ago. See Hans W. Baade, Proving Foreignand Domestic Law in Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA.

J. INT'L L. 619 (1978). Thus "United States courts regularly admit expert testimony about
the content and applicability of customary international law." Maier, supra, at 209. See also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 38, § 113(2) cMt. c & note 1.
11

"7

Maier, supra note 74, at 214.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 219-21.
I'

"9Id.

at 222.
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human rights cases. 12
Professor Christenson, one of the first commentators to call attention to the
choice of law questions with respect to the defendant's liability and the
amount of damages to be awarded in Alien Tort Statute cases,12 returns
to this topic in his article, which also contains a number of other pertinent,
albeit somewhat pessimistic conclusions, about the current status of
"Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic Court Decisions."" 2 Noting that "[m]any commentators credit the Kaufman opinion
[in Filartiga]with deciding that customary international human rights law
prohibiting official torture is to determine the outcome of the case as weln as
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute," he points out that "that was plainly
not what Judge Kaufman decided or said."'" The latter used customary
international human rights law only to find subject matter jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute, leaving to the District Court the choice of law
inquiry, which he characterized as "a much broader one, primarily concerned
with fairness . ,,"
Judge Nickerson's "under-appreciated opinion"" on remand remains the
most thoughtful, if not definitive, judicial treatment of this issue to date." 6
Since a default judgment already had been entered against the defendant, the

1 0 See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, supra note 36, at 184.
121 Gordon

A. Christenson, The Use of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional

Interpretation, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 39 (1981). For the present writer's views on these
questions, see Richard B. Lillich, Damages for Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Awarded by US Courts, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 207 (1993).
"2 Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic
Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225 (1995-96). Among them are that U.S.
courts "now seem to have adopted the exceedingly onerous burden of proving the existence
of a norm of jus cogens quality as the threshold to limit tort claims for violations of the law
of nations under the Alien Tort Statute," despite the fact that "[i]ts text refers only to tortuous
breach of the law of nations (or a treaty), a norm shown by reference to traditional sources
of international law," id. at 230, and that elsewhere, despite the fact that customary
international law "is part of our law" (see text at supra note 92), "federal courts do not
incorporate customary international law of human rights without clear legislative authority.
They simply do not give any encouragement to judicial application of the newer customary
international human rights law." Christenson, supra at 234.
123 Christenson, supra at 248.
'2 630 F.2d at 889.
12 Christenson, supra note 122, at 249.
'2 5 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). For a summary and critique
of this opinion, see Lillich, supra note 121, at 210-14.
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judge did not have to address the question of what law governed the
determination of his liability, but only the rule of decision concerning the
damages to be awarded the plaintiffs."' Concluding that he "should
determine the substantive principles to be applied by looking to international
law,"'" he nevertheless believed that he "should consider the interests of
Paraguay to the extent they do not inhibit the appropriate enforcement of the
applicable international law or conflict with the public policy of the United
States."'" Applying this approach, Judge Nickerson balanced the contacts
with the United States and Paraguay and found it "appropriate to look first
to Paraguayan law in determining the remedy for the violation of international law.""' Thus he held Paraguayan law to be the rule of decision with
respect to most items of damages. When it came to punitive damages,
however, which were not recoverable under the Paraguayan Civil Code, he
regarded it "essential and proper to grant the remedy of punitive damages in
order to give effect to the manifest objective of the international prohibition
against torture."'
He allowed such damages, though, not by invoking
public policy concepts, rejecting Paraguayan law and applying the lex fori,
but by looking directly to international law as the rule of decision.' 32
While Professor Christenson seems comfortable with both Judge
Nickerson's analysis and holding, he observes that "[c]ustomary international
human rights law, forum law and relevant foreign law represent different
policies and interests," and that "[a]ll should contribute to the best policy to
guide decisions for each aspect of human rights litigation in domestic courts
in the United States.',133 Addressing but going beyond the issues raised in
Filartiga,he identifies five distinct questions for courts to ask in international human rights law cases:
Jurisdiction. First, should courts ever invoke customary
international human rights law to determine federal jurisdic-

2 Presumably the same principles would apply to both questions. Professor Christenson
does not address this point, but his functional approach to the rules of decision in U.S. human
rights litigation suggests that he would agree with the present writer's assessment.
Christenson, supra note 122, at 251-54.
'2 577 F. Supp. at 863.
'9 Id.at 863-64.
"0 Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 865.
132Id. at 865-67.
"' Christenson, supra note 122, at 251.
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as law of the

United States or federal common law?"3
Substantive Rules of Decision. Second, assuming a U.S.

domestic court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case or
controversy (including transitory torts), should customary
international human rights law
ever determine the law
135
governing the cause of action?
Procedure of the Case. Third, should U.S. forum law

alone continue to govern procedure in human rights litigation with important effects in other countries?'3
Choice of Law Governing Remedies.

Fourth, what

principles should govern the choice of remedies sought or
allowed, including actual and punitive damages, equitable
137
relief and injunctions in aid of future enforcement?
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments Abroad.
Fifth, what principles of private international law or comity

should govern the enforcement of a judgment in the courts
of one state for breach of customary international human
rights law arising
in another against assets in the courts of
3
a third state?1

Professor Christenson's posing of these questions and his answers to them,

tentative as they sometimes are, represents a substantial contribution to the
identification and clarification of a number of significant issues that
heretofore have not received the serious, scholarly attention they deserve.
Both academic and practicing international human rights lawyers will benefit
from his careful analysis and thoughtful insights.
Another serious problem that often arises in connection with customary
international human rights law litigation concerns sovereign immunity.
Although nothing in the Alien Tort Statute prohibits suits against foreign
states, the Supreme Court in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
" held that the Statute does not constitute an exception to the
Corp.'39

"3

135

Id. at 251.
id.

'm Id. at 252.
137

id.

'38

Id. at 252-53.
488 U.S. 428 (1989).

'3
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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),'14 which now is the sole basis
for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states in U.S. courts. The Court
specifically ruled that the "tort exception" contained in Section 1605(a)(5)
of the FSIA was inapplicable in Amerada Hess, since it was limited by its
very terms to those rare cases where tortuous acts occur within the United
States. 4 1 The roadblock the Court thus raised to recovery against foreign
sovereigns was recognized by Professor Fitzpatrick several years ago, at
which time she urged the courts to recognize a "human rights exception" to
the FSIA and, if they did not, Congress to enact one into law. 42
Unfortunately, as Professor Bederman relates in his fine contribution to
this Symposium," neither eventuality has occurred. The courts repeatedly
have rejected arguments that a "human rights" or "jus cogens" exception to
the FSIA exists, most recently giving them an "ignominious burial"" in
the Princz case. 4" Congress, moreover, has shown no enthusiasm either
for writing such an exception into the FSIA or otherwise amending it to
permit human rights suits against foreign sovereigns.'
"The joker in the
deck," as Bederman remarks, "is, obviously, the Supreme Court's decision
in Amerada Hess,"'47 but as he ruefully observes it would take an "extraordinary shift in sentiment on the High Court"'" for that decision to be
overruled.
Indeed, perhaps the best that can be hoped for at present is that the courts
will reject claims by individual defendants-"the minions and lackeys of
foreign governments: free-lance torturers, war criminals, and exploiters" 14 9 -that they too are entitled to immunity under the FSIA on the
grounds that their acts really were acts of a foreign state. Since, as now

'40

28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441 & 1602-11 (1994).

4' 488 U.S. at 439. For one such case, see Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp.

665 (D.D.C. 1980).
14 Joan Fitzpatrick, Reducing the FSIA Barrier to Human Rights Litigation-Is
Amendment Necessary and Possible?, 86 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 338 (1992).
14' David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in
U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 255 (1995-96).
144 Id. at 273.
""Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd, 26 F.3d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 Sup. Ct. 923 (1995).
" For a summary of recent unsuccessful efforts to do so, see Bederman, supra note 143,
at 282.
'4 Id. at 281.
14 Id. at 282.
49 Id. at 257.
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seems settled, individuals may invoke the FSIA, the fighting issue has
become one of determining just when "an individual's actions [will] be
attributed to a foreign sovereign in order to grant immunity."' "
Bederman, who believes the courts unfortunately have "imported domestic
notions of respondent superior in sovereign immunity claims, and applied
them to the FSIA,"151 correctly concludes that "[i]f the standard of attribution is construed liberally, more individual conduct will be covered by the
FSIA, and thus fewer cases will likely clear the Act's presumptive grant of
immunity. 15 2 Thus he warns that "human rights advocates had best think
of arguments to defeat renewed claims by individual defendants that their
conduct is covered by the presumptive immunity of the FSIA."'5 It is a
pessimistic but nevertheless realistic warning."
In concluding this Introduction, the present writer would like to return to
the important point made by Ms. Stephens, namely, that "[i]nternational
human rights litigation will greatly increase in value if it is conducted in
many countries around the world, not just in the United States. '1 55 The
growing importance of customary international human rights law, as
Professor Hannum's article clearly reveals, is a worldwide phenomenon. As
long as there is less than universal acceptance of the major human rights
treaties-which, after all, do not form a comprehensive code of international
human right law and, moreover, permit reservations and allow derogations
and limitations to their coverage-there will be a need for a customary
international law of human rights, to be used both on the international level
and in the domestic context. While U.S. courts and U.S. lawyers have
played a prominent role in developing and calling attention to it, even
'Id. at 261.
151 Id. at 262.

He urges instead the use of international standards of attribution to

determine when an individual actor's conduct is imputable to a foreign sovereign, noting that

"[t]o date, no human rights litigation has resorted to the standard rules of attribution
developed in the law of State responsibility." Id. at 269. He admits, however, that "it may
be too late to deal a new hand in this regard. Attribution jurisprudence under the FSIA has
already been too heavily influenced by what may be inappropriate domestic analogies." Id.
at 270.
152
'5

Id. at 263.
Id. at 267.

154On a more upbeat note, Bederman sees much less of a problem with the Act of State
and forum non conveniens doctrines. Id. at 268-69. His conclusions here find confirmation
in Kadic v. Karadzic, supra note 37, at *52-53, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit summarily rejected such arguments.
'"

See text supra note 112.
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Professors Simma and Alston recognize its impressive flowering in many
other countries."
Frankly, however, foreign courts and foreign lawyers
have yet to play the role they should in creating and clarifying this growing
body of human rights law.
Several years ago, surveying U.S. human rights case law, the present
writer wrote as follows:

The courts of a single state, of course, cannot provide
even a partial solution to the problem of providing redress
to victims of gross human rights violations. Other states
should be encouraged to enact legislation.., to enable their
courts to provide similar redress against human rights
violators found within their jurisdiction. An International
Convention for the Redress of Human Rights Violations that
would obligate states parties to enact legislation along these
lines would be a promising first step. 5 7 Such a convention could define just what gross human rights violations
were actionable, provide a common choice of law approach
for courts to follow, establish general norms governing the
allowance of compensatory and, especially, punitive damages, and provide for the enforcement of judgments against
human rights violators wherever they may reside. While US
courts to date have taken the lead in the limited area of
providing remedies to aliens whose human rights have been

See text supra note 57.
The Maastricht Seminar on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1992
concluded, inter alia, that the proposed convention "deserves due consideration. The
preparatory and drafting process for such a convention can serve to focus the attention of
governments on these issues, promote exchanges of national experience and lead countries to
develop adequate arrangements for anticipating, preventing, stopping and remedying gross
violations of human rights." NErHERLANDs INsTrruTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SEMINAR ON THE
RIGHT TO RESTrrUTION, COMPENSATION AND REHABILIrrATON FOR VIcTIMs OF GRoss
'

157

VIOLATIoNs OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 20 (SIM Special No. 12,

1992). The Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities on this topic attached the Maastricht Conference conclusions to
his Second Progress Report. Theo van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution,
Compensation, and Rehabilitation,for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/8, at 21 (1992).
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violated, it is high time to expand and universalize the
protection that domestic courts are capable of providing."'8
If our colleagues overseas, including Professors Simma and Alston,
eventually join us in this great adventure, the U.S. "customary-law-of-human
rights school"'5 9 someday may become what Professor Schachter once
called "the invisible college of international lawyers.""6t If so, the use of
customary international human rights law to provide redress for victims will
have received a tremendous boost. In the meantime, this Symposium serves
to point the way.

158 Lillich,

supra note 121, at 216-17.
s See text supra note 55.
i6o Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of InternationalLawyers, 72 NW. U. L REv.
217 (1977).

